The explosion in spending by independent committees has posed a severe challenge for our campaign finance disclosure regime. Our campaign finance laws are reasonably effective at obtaining the disclosure of spending by and contributions to candidates and political parties, and of the disclosure of donors to committees that make contributions to candidates. But our laws fail to provide for effective reporting of the campaign finance activities of independent committees.
Disclosure law falls especially short in requiring the public identification of the wealthy individuals who are bankrolling the activities of these committees.
501(c) organizations are not subject to election law disclosure requirements at all. They are required to file certain reports with the Internal Revenue Service that will identify some of their donors, but these reports are not subject to public disclosure. Super PACs, as political committees, are subject to campaign finance reporting and disclosure mandates. But a significant fraction of Super PAC money comes from non-disclosing 501(c) organizations 16 The lack of adequate disclosure of donations to Super PACs is especially troubling as Super PACs are particularly close to the candidates they are aiding. Although technically independent of the candidates, all that means is that they are barred from consulting with candidates concerning the specifics of the decisions of which ads to air and what to say in those ads. But many of the high spending Super PACs in the current election cycle -Restore Our Future, Winning Our Future, Red, White and Blue Fund, Priorities Action USA -are committed to advancing the election of a specific candidate. They are operated by former staffers or campaign operatives of those candidates. They may share office space, media strategists, and consultants with the candidates they are backing. Their ads track the same campaign themes as the candidates and can even use the same ad footage as the candidates' ads. 19 The candidates may raise funds for the Super PACs, or send their surrogates to do so, and they may tell potential donors that contributing to the Super PAC is the same as contributing to the candidate. 20 Obtaining disclosure of the donors to a Super PAC is just as important as obtaining disclosure of the donors to a candidate.
Due to the rise of 501(c)'s and their use both as spending committees and as conduits for donations to Super PACs, and also due to the use of LLCs to veil donations to Super PACs, the percentage of independent spending paid for by undisclosed donors has risen sharply --from less than one percent in 2006 to 27% in 2010, 21 with an estimated one-third to forty percent of the 7 The problem of piercing the corporate veil goes well beyond dummy or shell corporations created to hide the identity of the individuals behind them. The most prominent
501(c) nonprofits --American Crossroads Grassroots Political Strategies ("GPS"), Americans for
Job Security, American Future Fund, Americans for Prosperity 26 and Freedom Works, Inc. 27 -are not simple shell entities created solely for the purpose of hiding the identity of a specific donor.
They are more like pooling mechanisms, enabling many wealthy individuals and firms to combine their resources, hire top-notch political talent, and together pursue a set of ideological or partisan goals. The anonymity they provide is a nice plus, and an attraction to potential donors, but these are very real organizations even if created solely for the purpose of aiding a specific party or party faction in election campaigns. 28 To a considerable degree, the corporate money problem is that corporations can be used to facilitate the aggregation of campaign funds from very wealthy individuals and to shield the role of those individuals from disclosure.
Yet, if Citizens United played a major role in giving rise to the disclosure problem, that decision also provides the doctrinal means for its solution. Citizens United enhanced the constitutionally protected status of disclosure by sharply contrasting the benefits of disclosure against the constitutional problems the Court has concluded are posed by restrictions on campaign money. Although Citizens United struck down any limitation on the use of corporate 26 applied to a spending limit. 34 The Court determined that public disclosure of the names and addresses of petition signers is justified by the state's substantial interest in "preserving the integrity of the electoral process" by combating fraud, "ferret[ing] out invalid signatures caused .
. . by simple mistake," and "more generally [in] . . . promoting transparency and accountability in the electoral process." 35 As the state's interest in electoral integrity was sufficient to sustain the law, the Court declined to reach Washington's additional argument that disclosure of petitioner names and addresses also served the goal of voter information that has been so central to the case for disclosure in the campaign finance context. But Chief Justice Roberts's opinion for the Court connected the integrity and voter information concerns in pointing to an overarching public interest in monitoring and understanding the workings of the political process.
In light of Citizens United and Doe v Reed adapting our disclosure laws so that they can deal with the new and expanded role of independent committees in our elections raises few constitutional difficulties. The challenge is, instead, a political one for Congress and state and local governments to design and enact laws that provide for the effective disclosure of the wealthy donors who are using independent committees to have a major impact on our elections.
Part II of this article lays out a reform agenda for more effective disclosure of independent spending. This requires addressing four issues: how to obtain the identities of the donors who contribute to organizations that make independent expenditures; how to define the election-related activity that triggers a duty to disclose; how to obtain disclosure of the natural persons behind corporate contributions and expenditures; and how to assure that disclosure is made in a timely fashion. Part II presents a series of proposals to address these issues and indicates how these proposals are consistent with Citizens United's approach to disclosure. 34 Id. at 2818, 2820 n.2. 35 Id. at 2819.
Part III concludes with further consideration of the proper scope of disclosure laws in our campaign finance system. In earlier work, I suggested that we require too much disclosure of personal information concerning relatively small donors. 36 Such information is of little use in helping voters make decisions about the candidates or propositions presented to them on election ballots. On the other hand, we currently provide too little information about the donors who are financing the independent committees that loom increasingly large over our election contests.
"Rightsizing" disclosure to enable voters to understand the financial forces behind our election campaigns requires that we both raise the monetary thresholds for disclosure and extend the ambit of disclosure to include the donors paying for independent spending.
II.
Making Disclosure of Independent Spending Effective
As the Supreme Court has put it, the disclosure of campaign donors matters because been construed by some courts to mean that election spending has to be the most important single spending activity of the organization in question.
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It is uncertain whether the constitution requires that "the major purpose" of an organization is elections in order for the organization to be subject to election regulation. "The major purpose" might just be an interpretation of FECA. In an analogous situation, the Court in Buckley initially held that to be treated as election-related speech for purposes of FECA disclosure a communication by an independent committee must consist of "express advocacy" of the election reporting requirements in a handful of cases involving groups that accept or spend relatively small amounts of money.
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Neither the "major purpose" nor regulatory burden objections to expanding the definition of "political committee" status is insuperable. The First and Ninth Circuits have the better of the argument that "a major purpose," defined by the expenditure of a significant amount of money on electioneering, not "the major purpose" is all that ought to be required in order to avoid the farcical result of an organization that spends tens of millions of dollars on electioneering being able to claim it is not a political committee because it spends even more money on legislative and grass-roots lobbying and ideological public affairs advertising. Still, such an expanded definition would face an uncertain judicial reception. In any event, expanding the definition of political committee at the federal level would -given the Supreme Court's governing interpretation of FECA -require legislative action, which is extremely unlikely from the current Congress. The possibility of a challenge based on the undue burden of compliance could be addressed by setting a relatively high monetary threshold for campaign activity before an organization is required to register and report as a political committee. But the question of when an organization engages in both electoral and non-electoral activities can be required to register and report as a political committee, and disclose its donors, would remain.
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However, even though the obstacles to expanding the definition of political committee could be overcome, it would probably be more straightforward, and certainly less legally problematic, to sidestep the issue of political committee status and simply require that any individual, group, or organization that spends more than a threshold amount on an independent electioneering expenditure -say $10,000 in a Congressional election -report all donations it receives above a contribution threshold amount -say $5000 -in the current or preceding calendar year. This is close to current federal statutory law, although the current contribution-reporting threshold is actually $1000. 59 However, the requirement that such independent spenders report their contributors was effectively neutered by the FEC in 2010 in Matter of Freedom's Watch.
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Federal law currently provides that a person who spends more than $10,000 on electioneering communications within a calendar year must file a report with the FEC within twenty-four hours that includes the names and addresses of all persons "who contributed an aggregate amount of $1000 or more to the person making the disbursement" since the start of the preceding calendar year. 61 In Citizens United, the Supreme Court upheld the application of this provision to Citizens With no majority of the six-member commission for either position, Freedom's Watch is not a formal ruling. But the case gives independent committees that are not federal "political committees" a green light to accept contributions and spend them on electioneering communications without disclosing their donors except in the unlikely event that a donor earmarks his contribution for a specific election campaign. Freedom's Watch, however, involved only the FEC's interpretation of its own regulations. It was not a constitutional decision: it has no effect on state disclosure law, and it does not limit the ability of the FEC to revise its position.
There still remains the question underlying the division in Freedom's Watch: what to do about donations to organizations that engage in both electoral and non-electoral activity? Can organizations that engage in independent election spending be required to disclose all their donations above a monetary threshold even if much of their spending is for purposes other than electioneering? Doctrinally, the question involves holding together the Supreme Court's recognition that voters have a significant "interest in knowing who is speaking about a candidate" 64 so that the donors who pay for independent spending can be subject to disclosure with the lack of any comparable provision for the disclosure of donors who pay for non-electoral activity. Indeed, the Court's freedom of association decisions indicate the constitution may provide some protection from disclosure to donors to organizations than undertake non-electoral 64 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 915.
political activities. 65 Practically, the answer must take into account the fact that independent spending fueled by large donations plays an increasingly large role in shaping the electoral debate, as well as the fact that many politically active groups engage in both electoral spending and other political spending that is not considered electoral. It is possible that at least some of the donors to such a group intend to support only its non-electoral activity.
The appropriate solution is to provide that any group, organization, or person required to report independent spending must also disclose the identities of all donors above a relatively high threshold amount, but to also enable an entity that engages in both electoral and non-electoral spending to set up a non-electoral account. Donors to the non-electoral account -which could not be used to pay for independent spending -would not be subject to disclosure. All other donations, which could be used to pay for electoral activity, would be subject to disclosure.
Alternatively, instead of enabling non-electoral donors to opt out of disclosure by earmarking their contributions for a non-electoral account, an entity that engages in both election-related and non-election-related spending could be required to set up a dedicated campaign account and pay for all its electioneering activity from that account. Only donations earmarked for the campaign account could be used for election activities, and only donors to that account would be subject to disclosure. The first approach is less burdensome for the groups, as an organization would not be required to segregate its funds; however, if it did not, all contributions above a threshold level would be subject to disclosure. The DISCLOSE Act of 2012, introduced by Senator Whitehouse in late March 2012 to reform federal disclosure laws, relies on a mechanism like this. 66 The second approach is more protective of the rights of donors. It imposes a greater administrative burden on the groups, but the burden would be relatively minor -and much less than the burden Citizens United suggested was created by the requirement that corporations and unions spend through their PACs. Such an account would be essentially no more than a bookkeeping device, not a separate organization. There would be no need for a separate administrative structure to control or oversee the account, and, of course, there would be no dollar limit on how much donors could give to the account. This approach safeguards the interests of donors to mixed electoral/nonelectoral organizations in not having their donations used for electoral activity unless they have affirmatively signaled that is their desire.
Either of these approaches would protect both the public's interest in learning the identities of the individuals whose contributions are actually financing the spending of independent committees and the interest of the non-electoral donor to such a group in not having his or her identity revealed. The precise mechanism could be left to the individual groups to decide.
B. Defining Electoral Activity
Once federal, state, or local regulators decide to require the disclosure of all donors who provide funds for independent spending, it becomes critical to determine what activities by noncandidate, non-political-party organizations are to be treated as election-related and, thus, subject to election law disclosure. One of the oldest and most difficult questions in campaign finance law has been just this question of the definition of election-related communications. 67 Vol. 4, at 4611 ("The most insidious problem with the campaign finance system involved soft (unrestricted) money raised by both parties. The soft-money loophole, though legal, led to a meltdown of the campaign finance system that was designed to keep corporate, union and large individual contributions from influencing the electoral process.").
overbreadth, Congress created a new category of "'electioneering communication'" consisting of (i) "broadcast, cable, or satellite communications" that (ii) refer "to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office," (iii) are aired within sixty days before a general election or thirty days before a primary election, and (iv) are targeted at the candidate's constituency. 74 In McConnell the Court upheld BCRA's extension of the disclosure and corporate and union expenditure restrictions from magic-words-style express advocacy to "electioneering communication." 75 Looking to the development of the issue advocacy loophole and the practical impact of issue ads on campaigns, 76 the record before Congress, 77 and the expert evidence presented to and the findings of the district court, 78 McConnell determined that "the issue ads broadcast during the 30-and 60-day periods preceding federal primary and general elections are the functional equivalent of express advocacy." 79 McConnell found the BCRA definition avoided the Charybdis and Scylla of vagueness and overbreadth. 80 Its components "are both easily understood and objectively determinable," 81 and therefore not vague. Nor was the definition overly broad.
Although some broadcast ads that air in the pre-election periods and refer to clearly identified candidates might have "no electioneering purpose," the Court concluded that "the vast majority of ads clearly had such a purpose." 82 Whether "in an absolute sense or relative to its application to election-related advertising, the record strongly supports the contrary conclusion" that BCRA's regulation of non-electioneering, or "true" issue ads, is not substantial. United also sought to air television commercials promoting sale of the film during the preelection period. As those ads were to appear on television, they could be subject to regulationincluding disclosure -if their content qualified as electioneering. Although the ads mentioned Senator Clinton, they were ostensibly selling a movie not calling for a vote, and so Citizens
United claimed the ads were exempt from disclosure because they fell outside of WRTL's "no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote" for a candidate standard.
The Supreme Court rejected that argument and the broader "contention that the disclosure requirements must be limited to speech that is the functional equivalent of express advocacy."
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The Court denied the applicability of the WRTL test to disclosure laws, thereby cabining the "functional equivalent" and "no reasonable interpretation tests" to spending limits -which after throughout the electoral cycle. As independent spending is increasingly associated with specific parties and candidates, it would make sense to expand the period in which communications by independent organizations are subject to disclosure.
The recently proposed DISCLOSE Act of 2012 defines the election period as the entire calendar year in which the election takes place for Senate and House elections, and the period beginning 120 days before the first caucus or primary as the election period for Senate elections.
Campaign ads are now aired long before the onset of the traditional pre-election period, with independent committees spending money attacking general election candidates as early as the opening months of the election year 102 and presidential election spending starting even earlier. test would more effectively facilitate disclosure of the financial forces behind the ads that are increasingly used to shape the campaign environment.
Moreover, today's independent committees are now far more clearly electoral than in the past. 109 Many of these committees, including the most highly publicized campaign finance actors If disclosure is to serve its purpose of informing the voters of who is paying for advertising that supports or opposes candidates, the PASO test should be applied to require financial disclosures by these organizations when their spending crosses a reasonably high monetary threshold. Or, if this is seen as unduly burdening organizations that combine electoral and non-electoral activities, the PASO test could be used for those independent committees whose principal officers and directors had within a defined period of time -say, five years - candidates -to channel money into elections.
C. Piercing the Corporate Veil
110 A leadership PAC is a political committee "directly or indirectly established, financed, maintained, or controlled" by a candidate for federal office or a federal officeholder, 11 C.F.R. § 100.5(e)(6) (2011), that is not the federal official's or candidate's own campaign committee but is used by its sponsor to provide financial support for candidates for other offices.
A central challenge for disclosure in the post-Citizens United independent spending era will be ferreting out the identities of the people who are actually the sources of funding for the independent committees that loom so large in our election campaigns. Paradoxically, this is not likely to be a problem when the reported donor to a committee is the sort of publicly held, publicly traded corporation that is the focus of concern for people troubled by the thought of corporate campaign spending. These corporations will often be well known to the public or at least better known than their officers, directors, or principal shareholders. The disclosure that, say, the Target Corporation has made a substantial donation to an independent committee 111 is likely to be at least as meaningful to voters if not more so than a disclosure accompanied by additional information concerning Target's officers, directors, or principal shareholders. So, too, there is not much of a disclosure concern when a union or other mass membership organization gives a campaign contribution to an independent committee. When the Service Employees
International Union, the American Federation of Teachers, or the National Rifle Association engage in independent spending in their own name or contribute to other independent committees, their funding reflects reflect broad support from a large number of small donors and their organizational names alone provide adequate information to the voters. There would be little point in requiring independent committees that receive donations from these organizations to also report their officers, directors, or principal individual donors.
The real disclosure issue arises when a 501(c)(4) social welfare organization, 501(c)(6) trade association, or Super PAC reports donations from a dummy or shell corporation or LLC which gets its funds from one or a small number of shareholders, or from a nonprofit that does not have a mass membership base but serves primarily as a vehicle for pooling funds from a small number of large donors and channeling them to independent spending committees. The potential for abuse by shell or dummy corporations was sharply underscored in August 2011 when reporters noted that the Romney Super PAC, Restore Our Future, had reported in its June 30th filing receipt of a $1 million donation from "W Spann LLC," a Delaware corporation with a Manhattan address that had been formed in March, made its contribution in April, and dissolved in July, with no apparent activity other than the donation to Restore Our Future. To tamp down the resulting controversy, the anonymous donor --a former executive at the investment firm
Romney once headed --soon came forward. 111 But that is unlikely to be the last time such a device is used to avoid disclosure. Indeed, Super PAC filings in early 2012 reported donations from such supporters as F8 LLC and RTTTA LLC -entities whose names are so non-descriptive that the donations might as well be treated as anonymous. Fittingly, the comedian Stephen
Colbert, who had already created his own Super PAC, Americans for a Better Tomorrow, Tomorrow, to draw attention to the Super PAC phenomenon, 112 announced he would form an anonymous shell corporation --appropriately named "Anonymous Shell Corporation" --to provide his donors with the same opportunity that donors to other Super PACs enjoy. 113 And if it should happen that a corporation contributes to a trade association, which in turn contributes to a Super PAC, the Super PAC would only have to report the trade association as the donor, without any reference to the corporation behind the trade association. 114 Similarly if a 501(c)(4) were to make a contribution to its affiliated Super PAC, the Super PAC would report the (c)(4) as the donor, not the individuals behind it. That appears to be the case, for example, with the conservative Super PAC FreedomWorks for America which received nearly half its funding from its affiliated -and non-disclosing --nonprofit FreedomWorks, Inc.
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If disclosure is to successfully inform the public who is providing the funds that are paying for an election campaign, then independent committees, when they are required to report their donors, should be required to source all contributions back to a publicly held corporation, a mass membership organization, or to an individual. If a trade association provides a contribution, disclosure would have to include the public corporations and individuals that provide the trade association with its campaign funds. If a contribution is provided by a nonprofit corporation that relies on individual contributions for its funds, the independent committee's contribution report would have to include the principal individual donors to the nonprofit, defined either as those who provided more than a threshold fraction (say five percent) of the nonprofit's funds or, given that such a fraction may be a moving target, those who donated more than $10,000 to the nonprofit (or if the nonprofit segregates campaign and noncampaign funds, more than $10,000 to the nonprofits campaign account).
The key point would be to make public when large donors, not small shareholders or a mass membership base, are behind the intermediaries who formally make the donations to the independent spenders that are aiding or attacking candidates. This need not be administratively burdensome. The FEC (and state regulators for state elections) could simply require that a Super PAC or other independent spender subject to donor disclosure requirements may not use funds for independent spending unless those funds come from an individual, a publicly held business corporation, a labor union, or a mass membership organization, or if its funds do come from a nonprofit corporation, trade association, or closely held corporation, it may use those funds only if the independent spender publicly reports the requisite information concerning the natural persons or public corporations that provided the nominal donor with campaign funds above a threshold level. This would not bar the use of corporate funds, but simply require that trade associations and nonprofits that rely on donations from other firms or individuals reveal the sources of their funds. To reduce the administrative burden, if the donating trade association or $10,000 or more to its campaign account), then the reporting independent committee could simply list the contributing trade association or 501(c)(4) and provide a link to its website to satisfy the requirement that all campaign expenditures be traced to the individuals, business corporations, or unions that provide their campaign funds.
Such a rule requiring that all campaign spending by independent committees be traceable to individuals, business corporations, labor unions, or mass membership organizations would go far towards assuring that disclosure serves its intended function of letting the voters know who is paying for the campaign messages they are hearing. With more and more campaign funds being routed through independent committees rather than candidates' committees or parties, and with corporations able to give to such independent committees and, arguably more importantly, wealthy individuals able to give unlimited amounts through shell corporations and nonprofit corporations, adopting disclosure rules requiring that spending be traced back to the firms and individuals that are the real sources of campaign spending is of increasing importance. With limits on spending by and donations to independent committees gone, disclosure of the individuals behind the independent committees becomes more critical. If disclosure is to be meaningful, rules requiring that spending be linked to the underlying donors -not the nominal donors --are essential. This is one loophole that ought to be easy to close. At the very least, Super PACs should be required to make the same pre-election disclosures as are candidates' authorized campaign committees. More generally, disclosure schedules and practices ought to be significantly updated to take into account both the early starts that mark many campaigns, and the availability of technology that makes the filing of campaign reports easy and instantaneous. In many hotly contested elections, there is no such thing as a pre-election year any more. Certainly, in presidential elections, with many key nomination contests now in early January, the last quarter, if not the last half, of the pre-election year is part of the election period. In major Senate races, too, millions of dollars may be spent on ads before New Year's Day of the election year. 120 At the very least, monthly reports ought to be required of all political committees that raise or spend over a threshold amount of money, in addition to the pre-election reports.
More fundamentally, with current electronic technology there is no reason to limit reports to calendar periods. Reports are no longer typed up and mailed in, as they were in 1976; they are filed electronically over the Internet. It would make sense to require instantaneous -e.g., within
twenty-four hours -reporting at least of large donations, such as those above, say, $10,000. FEC regulations currently require political committees and other persons who make independent expenditures at any time during the calendar year up to and including the twentieth day before an election to disclose this activity within forty-eight hours each time that the expenditures aggregate $10,000 or more. 121 In addition, independent spenders must report within twenty-four hours when disbursements for independent expenditures aggregate at or above $1000 during the last twenty days -up to twenty-four hours -before an election.
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Expedited reporting of independent expenditures ought to be supplemented by expedited reporting of the identity of major donors. Indeed, it is probably more important to report the donors than the spending. Any voter watching television, listening to radio, or logged on to the Justice Scalia has referred to as "civic courage" 138 should be necessary to handle these acts of retaliation -none of which actually turned on the disclosure of the names and addresses of petition signers.
Similarly, in an extended critical evaluation of disclosure laws, the Institute for Justice identified precisely one incident in which a campaign finance report created a risk of retaliation, when a campaign contribution by someone who was an employee of an animal-testing laboratory -and whose name, address and employer were disclosed in a report filed by the candidate to whom she had contributed -landed her and her home address on a list maintained by what the Institute called "an animal-rights terrorist group" which referred to the lab employees on the list as "targets." 139 However, nothing actually happened to the disclosed donor.
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At this point, then, despite the greater availability of disclosed information on publically accessible, searchable, and downloadable federal and state election agency websites, and the potential for politically active groups to use social media and the Internet to go after donors to campaigns or causes they oppose, it appears that relatively little in the way of illegal forms of retaliation have occurred. To be sure, legal responses -like nasty e-mails, "uncomfortable conversations," and even business boycotts -can burden donors, and the fear of both legal and illegal responses can make potential donors less likely to give or to hold their giving below the reporting threshold. 141 But the concern that the potential for increased dissemination of disclosed information concerning campaign supporters will chill political activity or lead to reprisals is, thus far, unsubstantiated by hard evidence.
Nonetheless, disclosure thresholds ought to be raised, and there is little reason to provide personal information, such as the names, addresses, or occupations, of small donors. Disclosure of large numbers of individual small donors whose names mean nothing to the public is unlikely to help voters evaluate the messages those donors are financing or the interests supporting a candidate. Indeed, extensive disclosure of small donors could very well distract attention from the big donors whose funds play a more meaningful role in understanding who is behind a candidate. There remains the question of the voter education benefit of disclosure. There is certainly a limit on what voters can do with disclosed information. If more than one candidate is being backed by the same donor or types of donors, such as hedge fund directors or venture capitalists, or if the voter strongly prefers a candidate on certain issues even if she is troubled by the interests financing the candidate, it will be difficult for the voter to act on the disclosed information. 142 I suspect that much of the public and media attention to disclosure, or the lack of it, of the donors behind Super PACs and other independent committees is less because disclosure provides an effective response to the large sums of money being pumped into elections by wealthy individuals and interest groups and more because disclosure is the only form of regulation of such spending that the current Supreme Court will permit. Much as the "law of the instrument" tells us that "when all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail," 143 so too, when the only regulatory tool available is disclosure, then disclosure is the regulatory solution people troubled by Super PACs and 501(c)'s call for.
Still, if disclosure is the only constitutionally available means of addressing the campaign activities of independent committees, then disclosure needs to be effective at doing the job it is called upon to do -informing the voters of the interests behind campaign messages and candidates in order to help them better appraise what they are hearing or seeing through the media and thus decide how to cast their ballots. That means we need much better disclosure of the donors to independent committees. With independent committees now major players, closely affiliated with the major candidates and parties, and prime vehicles for enabling wealthy individuals to commit to elections the resources they are not allowed to give directly to candidates or parties, disclosure laws need to be revised to provide full and timely information concerning the major donors financing the electioneering activities of these committees. That means (i) disclosure of the identities of all donors to groups engaged in electioneering unless their donations are clearly restricted to the groups' non-electioneering activities; (ii) a broader definition of electioneering that recognizes that significant electioneering by independent groups occurs outside BCRA's narrow pre-election window; (iii) requiring disclosure of the identities of the individuals and business corporations behind shell and nonprofit corporations that may be used to disguise the campaign finance activities of major donors; and (iv) instantaneous disclosure of all large contributions used to pay for independent spending.
Rightsizing disclosure by raising the monetary thresholds for disclosure to focus more precisely on those who give significant amounts to campaign while expanding the ambit of disclosure to more effectively reach the independent committees that, particularly since Citizens United, now loom so large in our election campaigns will make disclosure a more effective candidates. 147 Moreover, the major donors to the independent committees have a lot at stake in the outcome of the election. Their businesses are often in industries subject to considerable government regulation and they would benefit considerably from government tax or regulatory decisions that could be affected by the election of the committee they are backing through a
Super PAC or 501(c) nonprofit. 148 As a result, the justifications for requiring the disclosure of the identities of those who donate directly to candidates apply equally to the donors backing candidates through nominally independent committees.
Our laws are reasonably effective at obtaining and publicizing the identities of those who contribute directly to candidates; it is now critical that the laws be updated to make them effective at disclosing the donors to independent committees. Even if campaign finance disclosure has a limited direct effect on voters' decisions, it can still play an important salutary role in informing the public generally about the powerful economic forces that shape our elections, our politics, and ultimately, our public policy. Better disclosure concerning the donors to independent committees can provide the public with a valuable education concerning the influence of money on government and policymaking, and a window onto the interplay of campaign finance, lobbying, legislating, and political action. Disclosure can lead to new, responsive forms of political organization, closer monitoring of the linkages between major donors and elected officials in the legislative process, and new proposals for campaign finance or other political reforms. Such political action may also be a "proper way" 149 for informed citizens to react to the disclosure of the size and sources of the contributions at work in our election campaigns.
